1.Introduction
The Legal Aid Act, No 6 of 2016[1], was a watershed moment in Kenya’s access-to-justice architecture. Enacted to give effect to Articles 19(2), 48 and 50(2)(g) and (h) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010,[2] it established the National Legal Aid Service (NLAS)[3] and, crucially, created the Legal Aid Fund as the financial engine of the entire scheme.[4] The Act’s vision was ambitious: a national, affordable, accessible and accountable legal aid system that would reach the most vulnerable Kenyans — children, refugees, victims of human trafficking, the internally displaced, stateless persons, and the indigent.
A decade on, that vision remains a promissory note. The Legal Aid Fund has never been operationalised — that is, the National Treasury has never activated its funding mechanism or released monies into it.[5] NLAS survives on a skeletal government budget and donor lifelines that are, by their nature, temporary and targeted.[6] According to the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, over 10.4 million Kenyan adults — approximately 36% of the adult population — qualify as indigent for legal aid eligibility.[7] Yet the government’s budgetary allocation to NLAS for the 2023 financial year stood at a mere KSh 48,968,440, an amount that, measured against the size of Kenya’s indigent population, amounts to approximately KSh 3.50 per eligible person per year.
This blog advances three arguments: that the Legal Aid Fund’s financing architecture is structurally defective; that the resulting funding deficit is catastrophic in scale; and that a legally credible solution exists that does not require new Parliamentary appropriations. To unpack these arguments, the blog proceeds as follows. First, it maps the anatomy of the Legal Aid Fund and diagnoses the legislative and administrative gaps that have rendered it inoperative. Second, it quantifies the scale of unmet legal need and its cascading costs to the State. Finally, it proposes a multi-mechanism strategy for redirecting existing government funds — including unclaimed financial assets, savings from underperforming programmes, court-generated levies, and county co-financing — into a Fund whose mandate is constitutionally compelled.
2. The Legal Aid Fund: Anatomy of a Financing Mechanism
This part examines the architecture of the Legal Aid Fund in three respects. Section 2.1 maps the statutory sources of revenue prescribed by the Legal Aid Act. Section 2.2 diagnoses the dual legislative gap that has prevented those revenue sources from being activated. Section 2.3 analyses the structural risks created by NLAS’s consequent dependence on donor financing. Together, these subsections reveal a financing mechanism that is coherent in law but paralysed in practice.
2.1 Statutory Sources of Revenue
Part V of the Legal Aid Act establishes the Legal Aid Fund and enumerates its sources of revenue. Section 29 provides that the Fund shall consist of: (a) moneys appropriated by the National Assembly; (b) grants and donations made to the Service; (c) gifts made to the Service; and (d) any other moneys or assets that may vest in the Fund from any other lawful source.[8] On paper, this is a diversified, multi-channel financing architecture. In practice, it has produced almost nothing.
The first and most critical source — parliamentary appropriation (that is, the formal allocation of funds by the National Assembly in the annual budget process) — has never materialised in the form of a dedicated Legal Aid Fund disbursement. The National Treasury, which controls the consolidation and release of government funds, has to date neither allocated to nor disbursed from the Legal Aid Fund. Several factors have contributed to this failure: the absence of a mandatory minimum appropriation in the Act itself; a systemic prioritisation of infrastructure and recurrent expenditure over rights-enabling institutions; and the lack of regulations creating enforceable accountability for Treasury inaction. [9]This administrative failure, compounding over a decade, has created a structural paralysis from which NLAS has been unable to extricate itself through its own institutional advocacy alone.
2.2 The Dual Legislative Gap
The term “dual legislative gap” captures two distinct but related failures in the Legal Aid Act’s design: a permissive rather than mandatory appropriation clause, and the complete absence of fund governance regulations. Together, these gaps have created a legal vacuum in which the Treasury can fail to fund NLAS without any enforceable consequence. The failure of funding is not merely an administrative oversight; it is the product of this structural legislative deficiency. First, while Section 29 of the Legal Aid Act identifies sources of money for the Fund, it does not impose a mandatory, quantified annual appropriation obligation on the National Treasury.[10] This is a critical drafting omission: the provision is permissive where it should be mandatory. In contrast, comparable statutes — such as the Legal Aid South Africa Act, No 39 of 2014, which under Section 5 obliges the Minister of Justice to ensure that the Legal Aid Board receives adequate and equitable public funding — impose enforceable minimum annual funding obligations on the executive, providing a legal basis for budget compulsion. South Africa’s legal aid allocation has consistently exceeded R2 billion annually, representing a per capita investment many times higher than Kenya’s KSh 3.50. The contrast is instructive.
Second, no subsidiary legislation has been enacted to provide procedural rules for the governance, disbursement, and accountability mechanisms of the Fund.[11] While the Legal Aid Regulations of 2022[12] addressed the procedural framework for accreditation[13] and service delivery,[14] they left the Fund’s operational mechanics entirely unlegislated. There are no regulations specifying the criteria for disbursement, the timeline for release of funds, the audit obligations of the Board in respect of Fund expenditure, or the consequences of Treasury non-compliance. This regulatory silence is not neutral: it actively insulates Treasury inaction from legal accountability.
2.3 The Donor Dependency Trap
In the absence of state financing, NLAS has become structurally dependent on development partners.[15] This dependency, while enabling some service delivery, introduces three structural risks. First, donor funding is time-bound and project-specific — it cannot sustain a national legal aid scheme whose mandate is permanent and universal. The OGP Commitment KE0030, under which NLAS received significant support for court-annexed mediation and public interest litigation capacity, expired without a domestic successor funding arrangement, forcing NLAS to wind down several initiatives mid-implementation. Second, donor priorities may not align with the most acute legal aid needs of Kenya’s poorest communities. Development partners tend to fund high-visibility thematic areas such as gender-based violence and refugee rights, while routine criminal defence — the most common legal need of the indigent — receives comparatively little support. Third, and most structurally damaging, donor dependency reinforces a culture of institutional underinvestment by the State, insulating the Treasury from its constitutional obligation to fund rights-enabling institutions. When NLAS is seen as “donor-supported”, Treasury decision-makers face reduced political pressure to make domestic allocations.
Taken together, the three subsections of this Part reveal a coherent but dysfunctional financing architecture. The Legal Aid Fund has the statutory form of a well-designed mechanism but is rendered inoperative by a permissive appropriation clause, absent fund governance regulations, and a structural reliance on temporary donor support. Part III now quantifies the human cost of this dysfunction.
3. The Scale of Unmet Need: Victims Versus Resources
Having examined the structural deficiencies in the Legal Aid Fund’s design, this Part quantifies the human cost of those deficiencies. Section 3.1 maps the size of the eligible population; Section 3.2 documents the geographic exclusion resulting from NLAS’s limited footprint; and Section 3.3 analyses the compounding fiscal costs that the State incurs by failing to invest in legal aid.
3.1 The Eligible Population
To understand the gravity of NLAS underfunding, one must confront the arithmetic of need. NLAS considers persons earning below KSh 30,000 per month to be indigent for the purposes of legal aid eligibility.[16] According to the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, approximately 36% of Kenyans live below the national poverty line,[17] while over 7.8 million people lived in extreme poverty as of 2024.[18] Kenya’s adult population is approximately 29 million. Applying the 36% poverty rate yields an eligible population of approximately 10.4 million adults, without accounting for children, refugees, internally displaced persons, and other categories also eligible under Section 36 of the Act.
Against this population of over ten million eligible persons, the government’s allocation to NLAS has remained catastrophically low across multiple financial years: KSh 48,968,440 in 2023, with similarly meagre allocations in 2024 and 2025 that have not materially changed the per capita figure. The 2023 baseline translates to approximately KSh 3.50 per eligible person per year, and there is no evidence of a trajectory of meaningful increase.[19] To put this in perspective: a single day in remand detention for an unrepresented accused person costs the State far more in prison administration costs than KSh 3.50. The economic logic of underfunding legal aid is, therefore, self-defeating: the State pays more to detain the unrepresented than it would cost to defend them.
3.2 Geographic Exclusion
The resource crisis is compounded by geographic exclusion. NLAS operates offices in only five counties — Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, Nakuru and Eldoret.[20] The remaining 42 counties, many of them the most marginalised and poverty-stricken in Kenya — including Turkana, Mandera, Wajir, Marsabit, and Samburu — have no physical NLAS presence whatsoever.[21] The consequence is a de facto denial of the constitutional right to legal aid for millions of Kenyans who cannot travel to one of the five service counties.
Research confirms the scale of this exclusion. The Justice Needs and Satisfaction Survey found that only 10% of Kenyans use the formal justice system for dispute resolution.[22] This figure does not represent a cultural preference for informal mechanisms: it predominantly reflects structural barriers — cost, distance, and the absence of legal representation. The formal justice system, as the Supreme Court recognised in the landmark case of Francis Karioko Muruatetu and Another v Republic,[23] must provide meaningful, not merely formal, access to justice. That standard is impossible to meet without funded legal aid.
3.3 The Compounding Cost of Inaction
The failure to fund legal aid imposes cascading costs on the State. Courts are congested with unrepresented litigants who do not understand procedure, causing case backlogs.[24] Prisons are overcrowded with pre-trial detainees who cannot secure bail because they have no legal advice.[25] The cost of housing one prisoner in Kenya exceeds KSh 300 per day,[26] meaning that even a modest legal aid investment that secures the release of wrongly detained persons on bail would generate State savings that dwarf the investment.[27] Justice delayed and justice denied are not merely moral failures — it can be argued that they are fiscal inefficiencies that compound over time.
3.4 The Missing Mandatory Minimum Appropriation
The most critical gap in the Legal Aid Act is the absence of a mandatory minimum annual appropriation. Section 29 lists possible sources of money for the Fund but does not create an enforceable legal duty on the National Treasury to appropriate a specific quantum. Compare this with the Criminal Procedure Code, which under Section 191 grants courts discretion to assign counsel in capital cases,[28] a provision rendered hollow without State funding to remunerate assigned counsel. The Legal Aid Act must be amended to include a provision along the following lines: ‘The Cabinet Secretary responsible for Finance shall, in each financial year, ensure that funds appropriated by the National Assembly to the Legal Aid Fund are not less than 0.5% of the annual budget of the Judiciary.’ Kenya’s international obligations reinforce this imperative. The United Nations Principles and Guidelines on Access to Legal Aid in Criminal Justice Systems (2012) call on States to ensure that legal aid systems are adequately resourced. A National Treasury that appropriates KSh 3.50 per eligible person per year falls far short of that standard.
3.5 Absence of Fund Governance Regulations
The second gap is the absence of regulations governing the Fund’s internal mechanics. Section 28 of the Legal Aid Act gives NLAS the power to administer and manage the Legal Aid Fund. But Section 7(f) — providing for grants to civil society organisations to implement legal aid services — cannot be operationalised without regulations specifying how grants are applied for, evaluated, disbursed and accounted for. The 2022 Legal Aid Regulations addressed service delivery but said nothing about Fund governance. The Cabinet Secretary must urgently promulgate Fund Governance Regulations covering: criteria for disbursement to legal aid providers; minimum timelines for Treasury transfer of appropriated funds; audit and reporting requirements; and sanctions for non-compliance by holding agencies.
4. The Solution: Strategic Budget Reallocation Without New Appropriations
The conventional response to underfunded public services is to call for increased budgetary allocation — a plea that is easily ignored in competitive budget cycles. This blog proposes a more sophisticated strategy: identifying existing pools of government money that can be legally and constitutionally redirected to the Legal Aid Fund, without requiring new Parliamentary appropriations. Four principal mechanisms are proposed.
4.1 Mechanism One: Unclaimed Financial Assets — Redirecting Dormant Wealth to Active Justice
The Unclaimed Financial Assets Act, No 40 of 2011[29] established the Unclaimed Financial Assets Authority (UFAA) and the Unclaimed Financial Assets Trust Fund, which holds dormant bank deposits, unclaimed dividends, insurance proceeds, and other financial assets abandoned by their owners. As of recent estimates, the UFAA Trust Fund holds billions of shillings in unclaimed assets. While the primary obligation of UFAA is to reunite assets with their rightful owners, assets that remain unclaimed after the statutory period and for which no owner can be located represent a pool of effectively public money.
The Legal Aid Act should be amended — or a Memorandum of Understanding concluded between NLAS and UFAA — to provide that a fixed percentage (proposed: 15%) of the annual investment returns generated by the UFAA Trust Fund be channelled into the Legal Aid Fund. This mechanism is legally sound: UFAA’s primary obligation (reuniting owners with assets) is not compromised because the proposal targets investment returns, not principal. It requires no new Parliamentary appropriation. It is politically defensible because it deploys dormant private wealth in service of public justice — a concept consistent with the constitutional value of social justice enshrined in Article 10(2)(b) of the Constitution.
The Unclaimed Financial Assets (Amendment) Bill, 2024, has already introduced the concept of third-party designation of unclaimed asset disbursements. The same legislative amendment process provides a ready vehicle to insert a provision directing a portion of Trust Fund returns to the Legal Aid Fund.
4.2 Mechanism Two: Public Finance Management Act Reallocations — Redirecting Underperforming Programme Savings
The Public Finance Management Act, 2012 permits the Controller of Budget to authorise reallocations between programmes within the same vote, and provides a supplementary estimates process through which savings from underperforming programmes can be redirected.[30] An analysis of the national budget reveals chronic underspending in several government votes — including certain recurrent expenditure lines in the State Department for Correctional Services, the National Youth Service, and non-operational infrastructure projects.
NLAS, in collaboration with the Parliamentary Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, should identify three to five consistently underspending budget lines across government and advocate — through the Controller of Budget’s supplementary estimates mechanism — for the reallocation of those savings to the Legal Aid Fund. The legal basis is clear: the Constitution under Article 249(3) requires adequate funding for institutions that give effect to constitutional rights,[31] and a court-tested argument can be made that the systematic failure to fund NLAS is a constitutional violation remediable by mandatory appropriation orders.
4.3 Mechanism Three: Court Fines and Penalty Revenue — A Self-Sustaining Legal Aid Levy
A third mechanism, requiring legislative amendment but no new net government expenditure, is the establishment of a Legal Aid Levy on criminal court fines and civil court filing fees. The proposal is straightforward: a 5% surcharge on all court fines imposed in criminal proceedings and a 2% levy on civil court filing fees above KSh 5,000 would be ring-fenced and transferred to the Legal Aid Fund.
This mechanism is self-sustaining and self-regulating: as court usage increases (including by those using courts because they now have legal aid), the levy revenue grows. It distributes the burden of funding legal aid across the court-using population — those who can afford to pay fines and filing fees — rather than concentrating it in the general Treasury. Comparable levy structures exist in several Common Law jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom’s Access to Justice Foundation and Australia’s Public Purpose Fund.
4.4 Mechanism Four: County Government Co-Financing — Localising Legal Aid Funding
The Legal Aid Act envisages a collaborative framework between national and county governments. County governments, under the Fourth Schedule of the Constitution, bear responsibility for community facilities and local services. Legal aid — particularly for matters involving family law, land disputes, and local criminal proceedings — directly serves county residents and reduces pressure on county government social service budgets.
The OGP Commitment KE0039 has already identified the Mombasa County Government as a pilot for localised legal aid financing.[32] The model should be scaled: NLAS should conclude co-financing agreements with county governments under which each county allocates a modest fixed percentage of its County Revenue Fund (proposed: 0.1%) to a County Legal Aid Account, managed by NLAS county offices. This is not redistribution of scarce resources: it is an investment by counties in reducing the social and economic costs of unresolved legal disputes within their borders.
4.5. What Adequate Funding Would Unlock: The Expansion Dividend
The case for funding is not merely about meeting minimum thresholds of constitutional compliance. It is about the transformative expansion of legal aid services that adequate funding would enable. The NALEAP pilot phase (2009–2013), working with limited resources, reached over 25,000 Kenyans.[33] With a properly funded Legal Aid Fund, the following expansions become achievable within three to five years:
First, NLAS offices in all 47 counties, eliminating the current geographic exclusion of 42 counties. Second, a national mobile legal aid clinic programme, deploying paralegals with technological support to reach rural and semi-arid communities. Third, the accreditation and remuneration of community paralegals — currently operating without State recognition or compensation — who form the frontline of legal assistance for millions of Kenyans who never reach a lawyer. Fourth, the establishment of Justice Advisory Centres contemplated by Section 3(d) of the Legal Aid Act provides community-level legal education, awareness, and dispute resolution support. Fifth, meaningful implementation of the Alternative Justice Systems Policy, which requires funded community-level facilitation.
The combined effect of these expansions would not only serve the immediate clients of NLAS but would generate systemic returns: reduced prison overcrowding, faster case resolution, higher rates of voluntary compliance with court orders, and a more literate and rights-aware citizenry.
6. Conclusion
The Legal Aid Act, at ten, is a monument to unfulfilled constitutional promise. Its financing architecture — the Legal Aid Fund — is legally sound in conception but fiscally bankrupt in practice. The National Treasury’s decade-long failure to operationalise the Fund is not a neutral administrative omission: it is a structural violation of the constitutional rights of millions of Kenyans who face the courts without counsel, face detention without representation, and face the law without understanding it.
This blog has demonstrated that the solution does not require the State to find new money. It requires the State to redirect existing money — from dormant financial assets, from underperforming programme savings, from court-generated levies, and from county co-financing — into a Fund that already exists and whose legal mandate is beyond dispute. The mechanisms are legally defensible, fiscally neutral at the national level, and constitutionally compelled.
Justice, the Constitution declares, shall not be denied by reason of inability to pay.[34] At KSh 3.50 per eligible person per year, Kenya is denying justice by reason of deliberate unwillingness to pay. The ten-year anniversary of the Legal Aid Act is not an occasion for celebration. It is an occasion for reckoning — and for the legislative and fiscal reforms that will, at last, make the Act’s promise real.
* Duke Kipkosgei is a finalist LLB student at Kabarak University School of Law, with a keen academic interest in Human Rights, Access to Justice, and Constitutional Law.
[1]Legal Aid Act, No 6 of 2016, Laws of Kenya.
[2]Constitution of Kenya (2010) Articles 19(2), 48, 50(2)(g) and (h).
[3]Legal Aid Act, Section 5.
[4]Legal Aid Act, Section 29; establishing the Legal Aid Fund and listing sources of revenue including moneys appropriated by the National Assembly, grants, donations, gifts and moneys from other lawful sources.
[5]International Commission of Jurists – Kenya Chapter, ‘Legal and regulatory gaps inherent to the implementation of the Legal Aid Act’, ICJ Kenya, March 2024.
[6]Open Government Partnership Kenya, ‘Implement legislation to increase access to justice’ (Commitment KE0030), Open Government Partnership, 2026.
[7]Kenya Open Budget, ‘National Legal Aid Service budget 2023’, Kenya Open Budget, 2023.
[8]Legal Aid Act, Section 29(1): The Fund shall consist of moneys appropriated by the National Assembly for that purpose, grants and donations made to the Service, gifts, and other moneys or assets that may vest in the Fund.
[9]ICJ Kenya (n 6). The ICJ expressly noted: ‘the National Treasury has yet to allocate and disburse these funds, thus hindering its full operationalisation.’
[10]Legal Aid Act, Section 29(1). The provision uses the permissive ‘shall consist of’ formulation but imposes no mandatory minimum quantum. Contrast with the Legal Aid South Africa Act 39 of 2014, Section 5, which requires the Minister of Justice to ensure the Legal Aid Board receives ‘adequate and equitable’ public funding as a binding obligation.
[11]International Commission of Jurists – Kenya Chapter, ‘Legal and regulatory gaps inherent to the implementation of the Legal Aid Act’, ICJ Kenya, March 2024. ICJ Kenya further noted: ‘there is no subsidiary legislation to provide for the procedural implementation of the fund, thus posing a regulatory gap.’
[12]Legal Aid Regulations, Legal Notice No 86 of 2022.
[13]Legal Aid Regulations, Legal Notice No 86 of 2022, Parts III and IV, governing the accreditation of legal aid providers, paralegals, and civil society organisations.
[14]Legal Aid Regulations, Legal Notice No 86 of 2022, Part V, governing the provision of legal aid services. The Regulations are silent on the governance, disbursement, and accountability mechanisms of the Legal Aid Fund itself.
[15]OGP Kenya KE0039 (n 7): ‘A majority of NLAS activities are supported by development partners who are bound by time and specific targets.’
[16]NLAS eligibility criteria: Section 36, Legal Aid Act. Income threshold of KSh 30,000 per month, per National Legal Aid Service, ‘Legal aid’, National Legal Aid Service, 2026.
[17]Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, The Kenya Poverty Report (2024) based on the 2022 Kenya Continuous Household Survey. See also Wikipedia, ‘Poverty in Kenya’ citing World Bank data indicating approximately 25% of Kenya’s population lived below the international poverty line in 2023/2024.
[18]Statista, ‘Kenya: People in Extreme Poverty by Area 2016–2024’ (January 2026) noting over 7.8 million people in Kenya lived in extreme poverty in 2024.
[19]Calculated on the basis of approximately 14 million eligible persons (36% of ~39 million adults below poverty line) compared with a government budget of KSh 48,968,440, yielding approximately KSh 3.50 per eligible person per year.
[20]NLAS offices exist only in Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, Nakuru and Eldoret, covering merely five of Kenya’s 47 counties. Office of the Attorney General, ‘Provision of legal aid services’, State Law Office, 2026.
[21]ICJ Kenya (n 6): ‘NLAS currently only operates in five counties out of the forty-seven counties in Kenya.’ The counties of Turkana, Mandera, Wajir, Marsabit, and Samburu, among the poorest and most geographically remote, have no NLAS presence. See also National Legal Aid Service, ‘Background information’, National Legal Aid Service, 2026.
[22]OGP Kenya KE0030 (n 7): the Justice Needs and Satisfaction Survey indicated that ‘only 10% of Kenyans use formal justice systems for dispute resolution.’
[23]Francis Karioko Muruatetu and Another v Republic, Petition 15 and 16 of 2015, Judgment of the Supreme Court (2017) eKLR. The Supreme Court held that mandatory death sentencing violated Article 50(2)(q) of the Constitution. This landmark ruling implicated the right to effective legal representation and fair hearing for all accused persons, rights rendered meaningless without funded legal aid.
[24]Judiciary of Kenya, State of the Judiciary and Administration of Justice Annual Report 2022–2023, noting persistent case backlogs and the administrative burden imposed by litigants unfamiliar with court procedure. See also OGP Kenya KE0030 (n 7), identifying unrepresented litigants as a primary driver of case delays in Kenyan courts.
[25]Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, ‘The Condition of Remand Prisoners in Kenya’ (2022), finding that a significant proportion of pre-trial detainees remain in custody solely due to inability to meet bail conditions, a problem that adequate legal representation would materially reduce. See also NLAS Background Information (n 28).
[26]Kenya Prisons Service, Annual Report 2022–2023, indicating a daily cost of approximately KSh 300–350 per prisoner for basic food, shelter, and supervision. At this rate, a single month of pre-trial detention costs the State approximately KSh 9,000–10,500 per detainee, dwarfing the KSh 3.50 annual per capita legal aid allocation.
[27]National Legal Aid Service, ‘Background information’, National Legal Aid Service, 2026: During the NALEAP pilot phase (2009–2013), over 25,000 Kenyans were granted legal aid, demonstrating scalable impact when funding is available.
[28]Criminal Procedure Code, Cap 75, Section 191; providing the court,discretion to assign counsel in capital cases. The absence of a funded legal aid scheme undermines the effectiveness of this provision.
[29]Unclaimed Financial Assets Act, No 40 of 2011 (Cap 494, Laws of Kenya), establishing the Unclaimed Financial Assets Authority (UFAA) and the Unclaimed Financial Assets Trust Fund.
[30]Public Finance Management Act, No 18 of 2012, Section 24(5): the Controller of Budget may authorise reallocation of funds between programmes within the same vote. A supplementary appropriation or budget revision under Section 42 may redirect savings from underperforming programmes to NLAS.
[31]Constitution of Kenya (2010) Article 249(3): Parliament shall allocate adequate funds to constitutional commissions and independent offices to enable them discharge their functions. By analogy, the principle of adequate funding applies to institutions established by statute to give effect to constitutional rights.
[32]OGP Kenya KE0039 (n 7): ‘We hope that the Government is able to see that investing in grassroots justice is one of the pathways to achieve better economic outcomes and stability for the country.’
[33]National Legal Aid Service, ‘Background information’, National Legal Aid Service, 2026: During the NALEAP pilot phase (2009–2013), over 25,000 Kenyans were granted legal aid, demonstrating scalable impact when funding is availabletenth.
[34]Constitution of Kenya (2010) Articles 19(2), 48, 50(2)(g) and (h).
