Esther Munyiva Mwangangi*
Introduction
African solutions for African problems, has been a guiding principle adopted by the African Union (AU) and African states at large. External attempts to resolve African problems, have proven to be inadequate and counterproductive, highlighting the necessity for autochthonous solutions.[1] If charity begins at home, it begs the question what is the AU's response to the long-standing GERD dispute? The AU, a manifestation of the Pan-African vision, is well-positioned to spearhead the continent's territorial integrity, sovereignty, cooperation, solidarity, self-reliance and expeditious conflict resolution enshrined in articles three[2] and four of its Constitutive Act.[3]
Notably, the idea of autochthonous solutions to African problems does not preclude international collaboration, as evident in the involvement of the United States (USA), the World Bank and the European Union (EU) in the mediation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) dispute.[4] This article, therefore, examines these very mediation efforts in solving the GERD dispute by the AU and third-party facilitators and evaluates their effectiveness in pursuing expeditious resolution.
The dispute
For nearly a century, Nile riparian states have clashed over the use and management of the Nile waters, with Egypt historically asserting its hegemony over the Nile River [5] through colonial-era treaties, namely the 1902 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty,[6] the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty,[7] and post-colonial treaties like the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement between Egypt and Sudan.[8] Additionally, her high economic status, technological advancements and military power gave Egypt leverage over other riparian states, particularly the upstream countries that contribute the lion's share of the river's flow, like Ethiopia, where approximately 85% of the Nile waters originates from her Highlands.[9]
Egypt's de facto 'veto power' over the Nile waters was, however, threatened by the advent of the GERD, a monumental project for Ethiopia. From its onset in 1960, the GERD dispute considerably escalated in 2011 when Ethiopia commenced the construction of the dam despite Egypt's blatant disapproval. As the construction of the GERD continues, it casts a shadow over the regional relations of riparian states.[10]
The GERD dispute is rooted in the competing interests of three riparian states, namely Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia. On one hand, the GERD presents a myriad of opportunities for Ethiopia, such as economic development, increased internal energy generation, which will provide access to 65% of the population who lack electricity, industrialisation, and regional connectivity.[11] Additionally, it is a symbol of national pride given that the dam is Africa's largest hydroelectric dam and the 10th largest dam in the world.[12] On the other hand, Egypt opposes the GERD project, viewing it as a potential threat to her water security and supply.[13] The Nile is the lifeblood of Egypt's economic growth and development as the country relies on the river for approximately90% of its freshwater.[14] The third player, Sudan, occupies a precarious middle ground. She recognises the potential benefits the GERD can offer her while simultaneously being wary of the risks associated with the dam's operation. This juxtaposition of GERD's potential benefits and risks has created regional tension, which has only intensified as the dam nears completion.
Third-party facilitators
Due to these divergent interests, an agreement seemed far-fetched. Therefore, Egypt called for external intervention from the international community.[15] The USA and the World Bank were invited as observers in the mediation process. However, the trilateral negotiations collapsed after Ethiopia rejected a binding agreement with Egypt and Sudan on the filling and operation of the GERD, asserting its right to control the dam's filling. In response, President Trump's administration suspended the financial aid to Ethiopia by $130 million.[16] Regrettably, this only heightened the tension, hardening Ethiopia's resolve and casting doubt on the legitimacy of the USA as an impartial mediator. The GERD dispute remained unresolved, with Ethiopia completing multiple filling phases of the dam.[17]
The USA-led mediation failed because the disputing states disagreed on the role of the USA in the negotiation process.[18] Additionally, by suspending Ethiopia's financial aid, the USA exhibited bias towards Egypt and imposed itself as an arbiter instead of a neutral observer. Moreover, the US-led mediation disregarded fundamental principles of a successful mediation process such as party autonomy, neutrality, impartiality and consent. Admittedly, a party can only enter into a legally binding agreement in mediation voluntarily. A mediator, therefore, cannot impose an agreement on a party as the USA attempted to.
The European Union also expressed interest in facilitating dialogue, as it called for cooperation among the disputing parties.[19] Regional actors such as South Africa and Kenya also offered to mediate and support the AU's efforts in conflict resolution.
AU's involvement
Major milestones in the negotiation process had already been achieved before the intervention of the AU.[20] They included: the formation of the International Panel of Experts (IPoE), the Declaration of Principles (DoP), the establishment of a Joint Research Group, the involvement of third-party facilitators as observers and the disputant states' request for the intervention by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).[21] The DoP, especially, was hinged on the principle of reasonable and equitable use of water resources to prevent significant harm in the Nile Basin. It mandated that the parties share important information about any projects in the river basin.
The AU entered the mediation process in 2020, led by its then-Chairperson, President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa. Given that the disputants are member states, the AU was the ideal candidate for facilitating the mediation process. [22]Additionally, the AU had no conflict of interest, thus would uphold impartiality and fairness. Ramaphosa initiated high-level consultations and convened a virtual summit of the Bureau of the Assembly with the three countries, which marked a momentous step towards constructive dialogue.[23]
The AU established technical committees and created platforms for negotiations. The AU was instrumental in preventing the escalation of the conflict to a military confrontation, and the disputants' differences regarding the project's successful and peaceful operation were resolved. Over and above that, the AU succeeded in fostering discourse and providing a neutral platform for negotiations. The filling process, the annual filling schedule, drought mitigation protocols and settlement on the future disputes, however, remain undecided.[24]Despite AU's mediation effort, a persistent lack of binding agreements means the disputants have yet to reach an amicable resolution, leaving the situation precarious.
Challenges of the AU's involvement
AU's involvement has not been without challenges. First, the absence of binding agreements on transboundary resource management by the three states has been a stumbling block to the resolution of the dispute. Secondly, the contrasting interests and positions of the disputants muddled the negotiations, making it difficult to reach an agreement. Ethiopia asserts state sovereignty in developing its natural resources and emphasises that the dam will not significantly harm downstream riparian states.[25]
Egypt, in contrast, insists on a legally binding agreement on the filling and operation of the dam, highlighting the need for safeguards to protect its water rights.[26] Sudan adopts a middle ground, recognising potential benefits of the dam such as regulated water flow and reduced flooding, while simultaneously fearing the risks of its operation. Accordingly, Sudan seeks assurances regarding safety protocols and water management.
Thirdly, there's a significant trust deficit among the parties originating from historical grievances and geopolitical dynamics. Fourthly, the internal political pressures in the disputant states have had negative implications on the negotiation process.[27] Due to domestic political pressure, the countries fail to focus on the bigger picture. Finally, the legal and technical complexities of water rights and dam management require expert input to facilitate sustainable and informed agreements.[28]
Recommendations
The Nile riparian states have a common goal of safeguarding the Nile waters. They should therefore depoliticise the process and focus on finding a win-win solution for the benefit of all riparian states. On the other hand, the AU should promote broader regional cooperation on water resource management, encouraging dialogue that transcends the immediate dispute.[29] Principles like equitable and reasonable utilisation, duty to take all measures to prevent significant harm and general obligation to cooperate, encompassed in the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention, ought to guide the disputants in establishing a legally binding framework for water management and dam operation of the GERD.[30] In addition, the AU should strengthen its institutional capacity to be better equipped to facilitate future water transboundary disputes. Regional financial institutions, such as the African Development Bank, ought to spearhead funding of major African projects like the GERD, reducing reliance on external donors. Finally, the international community should support developing countries by promoting fairness and cooperation in addressing shared global challenges.[31]
Conclusion
In closing, the vision still stands: African solutions to African problems. The AU has paved the way by playing a pivotal role in mediating the GERD dispute. Although the path to resolution remains fraught with hurdles, there is light at the end of the tunnel. The resolution of the GERD dispute is not just a goal; it is a necessity for the future of the Nile riparian states and Africa as a whole. The time for action is now. Homegrown solutions for a better Africa.
* Esther Munyiva Mwangangi is a third-year law student at Kabarak University. She is a legal writer and researcher, and an enthusiastic advocate for Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). As an aspiring mediator and arbitrator, Esther is dedicated to exploring and writing about the practical applications of ADR.
[1] Biruk Kedir Mohammed, 'How the concept of "African solutions for African problems" can be applied to resolve the GERD dispute' 11(4) Open Journal of Political Science (2021) 594–613.
[2] Constitutive Act of the African Union, 11 July 2000, CAB/LEG/23/15, article 3.
[3] Constitutive Act of the African Union, article 4.
[4] Tsegaye Shewangzaw Zergaw, '"Mediated" negotiation over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: achievement, challenges and prospect' 1(7) International Journal of Water Management and Diplomacy (2024) 5–35.
[5] Gari Yared, Paul Block, Tammo S Steenhuis, Muluneh Mekonnen, Getachew Assefa, Abebe Kidus Ephrem, Yared Bayissa and Seifu A Tilahun, 'Developing an approach for equitable and reasonable utilisation of international rivers: The Nile River' 15(24) Water (2023) 22-28.
[6] Treaty between Ethiopia and Great Britain for the Delimitation of the Ethiopian Sudan Frontier, 15 May 1902, 191 CTS 178.
[7] Exchange of Notes in regards to the Use of Waters of the River Nile for Irrigation Purposes, 7 May 1929, 93 LNTS 43.
[8] Agreement between the Republic of the Sudan and the United Arab Republic for the Full Utilisation of the Nile Water, 8 November 1959, 453 UNTS 63.
[9] Ashok Swain, 'Challenges for water sharing in the Nile Basin: Changing geo-politics and changing climate' 56(4) Hydrological Sciences Journal(2011) 687-702.
[10] Shewangzaw, '"Mediated" negotiation over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: achievement, challenges and prospect', 5–35.
[11] Anwar Hassen Tsega, The geopolitics of water negotiations succeeding the GERD project in the Nile River Basin: The case of Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan, Insamer Research Center, 2017, 34.
[12] Max Bearak and Sudarsan Raghavan, 'Africa's largest dam powers dreams of prosperity in Ethiopia and fears of hunger in Egypt' The Washington Post 14 November 2020 -< https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2020/grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-egypt-nile/> on 13 September 2025.
[13]Cornel Otieno Okech, 'African Union in management of transboundary conflicts: case of Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Dam', Unpublished LLM Dissertation, Kenyatta University, 2023, 33-39.
[14] Dr. Mehari Taddele Maru, 'The Nile rivalry and its peace and security implications: What can the African Union do?' 1(1) Institute for Peace and Security Studies (2020) 1–13.
[15]Blanchard Lauren Ploch and Sharp Jeremy M, ' The Nile dam dispute: issues for Congress' Congressional Research Service, (2020) 1-4.
[16] Mohammed, 'How the concept of "African solutions for African problems" can be applied to resolve the GERD dispute' 594–613.
[17] Peace and Security Council Report, 'The AU's role beyond the GERD negotiations' AfricanInstitution for Security Studies, 4 September 2020-< https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/the-aus-role-beyond-the-gerd-negotiations > on 13 September 2025.
[18] John Mukum Mbaku, "The controversy over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam,' Brookings 5 August 2020 -< https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-controversy-over-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam/ > on 13 September 2025.
[19] European Union, New Ethiopian dam sparks controversy among Nile states, European Parliamentary Research Service, 2021.
[20] Mohammed, 'How the concept of "African solutions for African problems" can be applied to resolve the GERD dispute' 594–613.
[21] Tawfik Rawia, 'Regional mediation in African transboundary rivers conflicts: Assessing the African Union's role in the Renaissance Dam negotiations' 29(3) International Negotiation (2023) 565.
[22] Peace and Security Council Report, 'The AU's role beyond the GERD negotiations' African Institution for Security Studies, 4 September 2020-< https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/the-aus-role-beyond-the-gerd-negotiations > on 13 September 2025.
[23] Maru, 'The Nile rivalry and its peace and security implications: What can the African Union do?' 1–13.
[24] Okech, 'African Union in management of transboundary conflicts: case of Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Dam', 46-47.
[25] Peace and Security Council Report, 'The AU's role beyond the GERD negotiations' AfricanInstitution for Security Studies, 4 September 2020-< https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/the-aus-role-beyond-the-gerd-negotiations > on 13 September 2025.
[26] Egypt Today staff, 'Egyptian Sudanese 'Nile Guardians 'joint military exercise kicks off' Egypt Today, 28 May 2021 -< https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/104396/Egyptian-Sudanese-%E2%80%98Nile-Guardians%E2%80%99-joint-military-exercise-kicks-off > on 13 September 2025.
[27] Shewangzaw, '"Mediated" negotiation over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: achievement, challenges and prospect', 10.
[28] United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Practical guide for the development of agreements or other arrangements for Transboundary Water Cooperation, United Nations Publications, 2021, 116, para. 1.
[29] Mohammed, 'How the concept of "African solutions for African problems" can be applied to resolve the GERD dispute' 594–613, para 61.
[30] Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 21 May 1997, A/51/49.
[31] Shewangzaw, '"Mediated" negotiation over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: achievement, challenges and prospect', 14.
