By Chepkorir Sambu[*]
An inter-governmental body looking to ultimately transform into a political federation must inevitably concern itself with the issue of peace and security. Most regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa, at formation, were driven by the primary goals of economic and, to a great extent, cultural integration. However, they have eventually adopted some form of political integration inspired by security concerns.
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) realised early that achieving economic integration was closely tied to peace and stability. It became the first REC to comprehensively pursue norms relating to democracy, governance, and conflict prevention, management and resolution, as well as establish institutions of peace and security, notably the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). ECOWAS began deploying peace-keeping missions and engaging in military interventions in some of its Member States, beginning with Liberia in 1990.[ii]
In 1999, the East African Community (EAC or Community), through its rebirth in the Treaty Establishing the East African Community (the Treaty), also acknowledged this position in Article 124.[iii] The Article dictates that peace and security are prerequisites to social and economic development.[iv] Yet, peace and security, or lack thereof, are not just prerequisites but also consequences of development, including harsh economic conditions, and the colonial legacies of violence and separation.
Ogboye and Ochieng broadly emphasise the need to balance economic considerations with security concerns within the EAC, asserting that the EAC has focused disproportionately on the former, an argument which is crucial and cogent.[v] The challenge, however, is to ensure that security matters do not overpower the other elements of integration or result in the securitisation of the integration process. Essentially, care should be taken so that this does not become the primary preoccupation of the EAC and lead to a situation where security is instrumentalised, that is, securitisation that serves the interests of some Partner States.
Presently, security concerns and considerations at the EAC are at their highest. Two factors primarily account for this: one, the expansion through the last three membership admissions of Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and South Sudan which have been accompanied by heavy security dynamics; and two, the tensions among all its Partner States, with the exception of Tanzania and, to a small extent, Kenya. Additionally, the EAC, like the rest of Africa, is generally grappling with terrorism, transnational conflicts, and transnational crimes, and their attendant humanitarian and political effects.
As such, this blog piece broadly studies the peace and security mandate of the EAC, the implementation of that mandate, and the emerging dynamics within the bloc.
Normative framework and intervening events
The Treaty
The current EAC was established via the 1999 Treaty, which defines integration objectives. Commonly known as pillars, they are a Customs Union, a Common Market, followed by a Monetary Union, and ultimately a Political Federation.[vi] Article 5(1) outlines defence and security as one of the areas for widening and deepening cooperation, and Article 5(3)(f) mandates the EAC to promote internal peace, security, stability, and good neighbourliness. Further, the Treaty reserves for the Summit the function of reviewing peace and security matters.[vii]
Article 124 tackles peace and security. This provision, tellingly, is enshrined under Chapter 23 of the Treaty on 'Cooperation in Political Matters' whose objective is to realise a Political Federation.[viii] Although most of the issues covered under 'Regional Peace and Security' in Article 124 relate to crimes rather than conflicts, the management of refugees and terrorism are highlighted.[ix]
Notably, Partner States have made gradual strides towards strengthening the normative framework on defence, pursuant to Article 125 of the Treaty.[x]
Towards a peace and security architecture
In 2006, seven years after its establishment, the EAC adopted a Peace and Security Strategy.[xi] Like Article 124, the strategy primarily covered transnational crimes rather than intra- or inter-state conflicts. The EAC Partner States then were Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, which may explain why peace and security issues seemed mostly limited to crimes.
In 2012, EAC Partner States concluded and signed the Protocol on Co-operation in Defence Affairs.[xii] Article 17 of the protocol establishes an EAC Mutual Defence Pact. Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda subsequently concluded a mutual defence pact in 2015;[xiii] the matter is still awaiting conclusion to ensure the whole Community settles on a mutual defence pact.[xiv]
In addition, the Community chose to co-operate with its neighbouring states to combat small arms and light weapons in the region. All EAC Partner States are members of the Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA), an institutional body created in 2005,[xv] to implement the Nairobi Protocol on the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States.[xvi]
In 2013, the EAC finalised and released its Protocol on Peace and Security together with an EAC Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Mechanism.[xvii] At this stage, EAC membership had grown from three to five with the admission of Burundi and Rwanda in 2007.[xviii] Moreover, by 2012, piracy had become a security issue in the Eastern African coast and the Al-Shabaab insurgency had emerged strongly enough to pose threats to Kenya and Uganda; in fact, the Al-Shabaab had launched its first terrorist attack outside Somalia, in Kampala, Uganda, in July 2010.[xix] Burundi and Rwanda share many similarities, including a historical concern for genocide. Naturally, these issues—piracy, terrorism, and genocide—were among those that found their way into the Protocol.[xx]
Subsequently, the Peace and Security Protocol marks a normative evolution at EAC of tackling conflicts, and not just crimes, head-on. Article 3(2)(a) lists intra- and inter-state conflicts and aggression while Article 3(2)(h) lists terrorism and piracy as issues that Partner States need to build capacity to address. Articles 5,6 and 7 of the protocol provide in detail what is expected of the EAC in relation to genocide, terrorism, and piracy, respectively. The Peace and Security Protocol had been ratified by all of the then EAC Partner States by 2021.[xxi]
Piracy directly concerns Kenya and Somalia but has reverberating effects on the landlocked Partner States. Contrastingly, terrorism affects almost all Partner States as a transnational threat posed chiefly by Al-Shabaab, operating in Kenya and Somalia and a direct concern for Uganda, and the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP, now synonymous with the Allied Democratic Forces) operating mostly against Uganda and the DRC, with support from elements within Kenya, Somalia, and Tanzania.[xxii]
The Protocol also includes intervening operations, which is a central aspect of peace and security for multilateral institutions. Article 1 introduces combined operations and joint operations, with the latter including peace operations. Both operations are mentioned as ways of combatting terrorism and piracy, among others. Peace-support operations further fall under the purview of conflict prevention, management, and resolution and ought to be conducted within such a mechanism.[xxiii] The Protocol should define more clearly and distinguish among combined operations, joint operations, peace-keeping, and peace operations.
Lastly, Article 4(3) gives the EAC the power to mediate conflicts within the Community, be they inter- or intra-state.
The case of DRC and a Pandora's box of security imbroglios
DRC was admitted to the EAC on 29 March 2022[xxiv] and acceded to the Treaty on 8 April 2022.[xxv] Was the DRC striking a security bargain when it decided to join the EAC? This question emerges when assessing the hurried series of events that followed its accession.
Shortly after its accession, the EAC Heads of State, under the leadership of then President of Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta, began holding conclaves on the situation in the DRC. In the second conclave, held on 21 April 2022, the Heads of State resolved to commence a peace and security process in the DRC.[xxvi] In this meeting, they elected to approach the situation in two tracks: the Political Track and the Military Track. The Political Track, named the Nairobi Process, established a peace process in which Uhuru Kenyatta would facilitate talks between the DRC and the armed groups operating within it. The Military Track necessitated a regional force to 'contain and, where necessary, fight the negative forces' within the DRC. The deployment of this force was rendered of urgent necessity.
In the third conclave held two months later, the resulting communiqué clarified the areas of focus in the DRC, discussed the logistics and strategy of the proposed regional force, and provided updates on peace talks.[xxvii] The implementation of an immediate ceasefire was also instructed. One month later, in an Ordinary Summit of the Heads of State on 22 July 2022, the Nairobi Process was formalised and the deployment of the Joint Regional Force in Eastern DRC, the first for the EAC, was directed.[xxviii]
Eastern DRC, which hosts many armed groups, was designated as the area of operation. As a joint regional force, all the EAC Partner States would ideally contribute troops to form the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF). However, President Félix Tshisekedi refused such contribution from Rwandan troops, asserting that Rwanda had been supporting the March 23 Movement (M23), one of the principal insurgent groups the DRC Armed Forces is fighting in Eastern DRC.[xxix] This condition reveals the first security dynamic within the EAC. Rwanda and DRC have had security tensions for decades, with each side alleging that the other is supporting its enemy insurgent groups. Indeed, United Nation reports indicate that Rwanda has been providing external support to the M23.[xxx] Uganda has also been implicated in the past, though less consistently than Rwanda.
According to the EACRF strategy, the Kenyan contingent would be stationed in North Kivu; Uganda in Ituri and North Kivu where it would help combat the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a common enemy; South Sudan in Haut-Ulélé, where it would fight remnants of the Lord Resistance Army; and Tanzania and Burundi in South Kivu where they would fight, among others, RED-Tabara,[xxxi] an armed group opposed to the Burundian government.[xxxii] With the exception of Kenya and Tanzania, it is clear that the deployment pattern was meant to allow for the settling of standing incompatibilities between governments and their corresponding enemy insurgent groups resident in the DRC. Burundi, Kenya, South Sudan, and Uganda actually contributed troops, with Burundi and Uganda having already had their troops in the DRC under prior bilateral agreements.
Burundi was the first to deploy its force on 15 August 2022 and Kenya followed. However, disappointment expressed by President Tshisekedi, who expected the EACRF to root out the M23, led to the withdrawal of the EACRF in December 2023.[xxxiii] In the process, however, tensions between Burundi and Rwanda arose over the insurgent group RED-Tabara operating against Burundi from the DRC. Burundi alleged that Rwanda had been supporting RED-Tabara[xxxiv] and subsequently closed its border with Rwanda in January 2024.[xxxv]
Security tensions have since (re)surfaced among EAC Partner States as an effect of the EAC intervention in the DRC. While the EACRF no longer operates in the DRC, the Nairobi Process is still active, albeit making little progress. It is unclear where the future of the EAC, in relation to these dynamics, stands. The Community will more likely continue to confront security situations or manage conflicts within its Partner States.
Conclusion
This piece's goal was to study the peace and security developments within the EAC, in a bid to understand and determine whether the EAC may be on a path to securitisation. Its premise was to demonstrate that, while previously preoccupied with economic integration, the EAC is beginning to focus more on peace and security due to prevailing insecurity and expansion in membership. Delving into peace and security is not only inevitable but necessary for a bloc which has ambitions to transform into a political federation. Yet, securitisation might threaten the sustainability of the EAC. The DRC intervention has revealed inter-state tensions within the EAC, particularly among Burundi, DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda. More careful and gradual approaches must be taken while exploring and implementing this mechanism to ensure it does not threaten the survival and integrity of the Community. Time will tell the way forward in an EAC where the peace and security architecture is clearly yet to crystallise.
[*] The author is a lawyer and researcher focusing on conflicts and peace processes in Africa (Twitter | LinkedIn).
[ii] Al Jazeera, 'Timeline: A history of ECOWAS military interventions in three decades' Al Jazeera,1 August 2023, available at < https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/1/timeline-a-history-of-ecowas-military-interventions-in-three-decades> on 26 August 2024.
[iii] Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community (1999).
[iv] Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, article 124(1).
[v] Mariam Ogboye and Beverly Ochieng, 'Expansion versus cohesion: The East African Community's turbulent journey to greater unity' Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 7 May 2024, available at<https://www.csis.org/analysis/expansion-versus-cohesion-east-african-communitys-turbulent-journey-greater-unity> on 26 August 2024.
[vi] Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, article 5(2).
[vii] Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, article 11(3).
[viii] Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, article 123(1).
[ix] Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, article 124(5)(h) and 124(6).
[x] National Assembly, 'Report on the East African Community Protocol on Cooperation in Defence Affairs', 7 July 2015, 9, available at < http://217.21.116.44/xmlui/handle/123456789/3277 > on 26 August 2024.
[xi] EAC, 'Peace and security' EAC, available at < https://www.eac.int/why-invest-in-eac/peace-and-security > on 26 August 2024.
[xii] The Protocol is available at < This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. > on 26 August 2024.
[xiii] National Assembly, 'Report on the East African Community Protocol on Co-operation in Defence Affairs'.
[xiv] Ministers of East African Community Affairs and Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 'Communiqué: Retreat of Ministers of East African Community Affairs and Ministers of Foreign Affairs on Enhancing Regional Integration, Peace and Security in the East African Community' 6-8 July 2024, available at < https://www.eac.int/communique/3132-communiqu%C3%A9-of-the-eac-ministerial-retreat-on-peace-and-security,-partner-states-relations-and-integration-process > on 26 August 2024.
[xv] Regional Centre on Small Arms, 'Member States – RECSA' RECSA, available at <https://www.recsasec.org/member-states/ > on 26 August 2024.
[xvi] Nairobi Protocol on the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States (2004), available at <https://www.recsasec.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/NairobiProtocol-artwork.pdf> on 26 August 2024.
[xvii] Protocol on Peace and Security (2013).
[xviii] EAC, 'History of the EAC', EAC, available at <https://www.eac.int/customs/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=57:tanzania-rwanda-burundi-in-rail-deal-&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=163# > on 26 August 2024.
[xix] Council on Foreign Relations '2004-2022: Al-Shabaab in East Africa' Council on Foreign Relations, available at <https://www.cfr.org/timeline/al-shabaab-east-africa> on 26 August 2024.
[xx] Protocol on Peace and Security, article 2(3).
[xxi] Select Committee on Regional Integration, 'Report on the Consideration of the East African Legislative Assembly's Report of the Committee on Regional Affairs and Conflict Resolution on the Oversight Activity on the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the East African Region' National Assembly of Kenya, Twelfth Parliament (Fifth Session), 30 March 2021.
[xxii] Caleb Weiss, Ryan O'Farrell, Tara Candland and Laren Poole, 'Fatal transaction: The funding behind the Islamic State's Central Africa Province' Program on Extremism at George Washington University, 2023, available at <https://extremism.gwu.edu/fatal-transaction> on 26 August 2024.
[xxiii] Protocol on Peace and Security, article 8(2).
[xxiv] EAC, 'The Democratic Republic of the Congo joins EAC as its 7th Member' EAC, 29 March 2022, <https://www.eac.int/press-releases/2402-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-joins-eac-as-its-7th-member> on 26 August 2024.
[xxv] EAC, 'The Democratic Republic of the Congo formally joins EAC after signing of the Treaty of Accession to the Community' EAC, 8 April 2022, available at <https://www.eac.int/press-releases/2411-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-formally-joins-eac-after-signing-of-the-treaty-of-accession-to-the-community> on 26 August 2024.
[xxvi] EAC, 'Communiqué: Second Heads of State Conclave on the Democratic Republic of Congo' 21 April 2022, available at <https://www.presidence.gov.bi/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Final-Draft-Communique-DRC-21-April-2022-1-1.pdf> on 26 August 2024.
[xxvii] EAC, 'Communiqué: The Third Heads of State Conclave on the Democratic Republic of Congo - The Nairobi Process' 20 June 2022, available at <https://www.eac.int/communique/2504-communiqu%C3%A9-the-third-heads-of-state-conclave-on-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-the-nairobi-process> on 26 August 2024.
[xxviii] EAC, 'Communiqué of the 22nd Ordinary Summit of the EAC Heads of State' 22 July 2022, available at <https://www.eac.int/communique/2537-communiqu%C3%A9-of-the-22nd-ordinary-summit-of-the-east-african-community-heads-of-state> on 26 August 2024.
[xxix] Africanews, 'DRC rejects participation of Rwanda in regional force' Africanews, 19 June 2022, available at <https://www.africanews.com/2022/06/19/drc-rejects-participation-of-rwanda-in-regional-force/> on 26 August 2024.
[xxx] United Nations Security Council, 'Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo' (S/2024/432) 4 June 2024, available at < https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/final-report-group-experts-democratic-republic-congo-s2024432-enarruzh> on 26 August 2024.
[xxxi] RED-Tabara in full is Resistance for Rule of Law in Burundi (Résistance pour un État de Droit au Burundi in French).
[xxxii] Nelleke van de Walle, 'East Africa's DR Congo Force: The case for caution' International Crisis Group, 25 August 2022, available at <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/great-lakes/democratic-republic-congo/east-africas-dr-congo-force-case-caution>on 26 August 2024.
[xxxiii] Mary Wambui, 'EACRF completes withdrawal from Eastern DR Congo' The East African, 21 December 2023, available at <https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/eacrf-completes-exit-from-eastern-drc-4471016> on 26 August 2024.
[xxxiv] Patrick Hajayandi, 'Burundi-Rwanda rivalry: RED-Tabara rebel attacks add to regional tensions' The Conversation, 14 April 2024, available at <http://theconversation.com/burundi-rwanda-rivalry-red-tabara-rebel-attacks-add-to-regional-tensions-225801> on 26 August 2024.
[xxxv] Al Jazeera, 'Burundi closes border with Rwanda in latest East Africa row' Al Jazeera, 12 January 2024, available at <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/12/burundi-closes-border-with-rwanda-in-latest-east-africa-row#> on 26 August 2024.
