Colonialism has caused a wide-spread involuntary intermixing of Western and African intellectual categories in the thinking of contemporary Africans. It is only through a critical spirit that a contemporary African can construct a philosophy suited to present-day existence.[1]~Kwasi Wiredu~
By Laureen Mukami Nyamu*
The contemporary African is a tapestry of ideologies, idiosyncrasies and world views, both African and otherwise, mashed together by colonialism and globalisation. This is evident in how we dress, talk, think and more specifically how we apply bioethics to controversial facets of biomedical research. Often, African philosophy is thought of as non-existent or inadequate in addressing the complex multi-faceted issues in bioethics such as personhood.[2] The result of which is the application of bioethics principles that are not well suited to the needs of the present-day African existence.
Human embryonic stem cell research is one of the most contentious facets of biomedical research that has fallen victim to this phenomenon. On the one hand, there is the promise this research holds, and on the other there is the ethical and philosophical conundrum posed.
Human embryonic stem cell research involves the extraction of stem cells from week-old human embryos for the purpose of research. Stem cells are specialised cells of the human body that are able to differentiate into any cells of the human body and have the ability for self-renewal.[3] These cells are particularly important since they serve as the internal repair system of the body and could help in the repair and replacement of damages tissues and organs.[4] Additionally, stem cells have uses in stem-cell based therapies such as the treatment of leukemia.[5] In addition to their use in stem-cell therapies, they could be used in biomedical research such as in drug-testing.[6] Embryonic stem cells are advantageous since they are easier to obtain than adult stem cells,[7] they have a higher proliferation capacity than adult stem cells[8] meaning they can multiply more readily and they are more pluripotent as compared to adult stem cells, they can therefore differentiate into any cell in the body.[9]
Stem cells from embryos are extracted using an invasive micro-surgical procedure that consequently destroys the embryo.[10] This destruction of the embryos forms the crux of the controversy surrounding embryonic stem cell research. On one side of the divide, pro-embryonic stem cell research arguments rely on the principle of beneficence. Beneficence is a principle of biomedical ethics that morally mandates benefiting others, preventing avoidable suffering and premature death and maximising possible benefits while minimising possible harm.[11] Additionally, proponents of this position while agreeing that human embryos are indeed human organisms, argue that human embryos are not persons since they do not possess additional characteristics such as the capacity for rational thought or self-awareness.[12] Therefore, they are not entitled to full moral respect.[13]
Conversely, anti-embryonic stem cell research arguments posit that this research is wrong since it deliberately destroys human embryos which are human beings.[14] Proponents of this argument accord full moral status to human embryos[15] and aver that human beings in all developmental stages have intrinsic value by virtue of the kind of thing that they are, that is a human being.[16] Since they have this intrinsic value, we are morally obligated to respect them and grant them rights. From these polarising arguments, various questions arise, such as, are human embryos human beings? And if they are human beings, are they persons? Also, is it the mere fact of being biologically human or is it the attainment of personhood that entitles one to human rights?
A reading of the Universal Declaration of Bioethics and Human Rights and other such instruments provides little guidance on the moral status and personhood of entities such as human embryos.[17] The existing Kenyan legal framework on human embryonic stem cell research further exacerbates the situation. The Kenyan State has enacted the National Guidelines for the Ethical Conduct of Biomedical Research Involving Human Participants which stipulate that human embryonic stem cell research should conform to a set of ethical principles.[18] However, the Guidelines do not stipulate what ethical principles the research should conform to or the moral status and personhood of human embryos.
The Constitution of Kenya makes an attempt at answering these questions. The Constitution stipulates that every person has the right to life.[19] Further, it stipulates that the life of a person begins at conception.[20] However, the Constitution, in very juristic fashion, defines person in Article 260 to include a company, association or any other incorporated or unincorporated body of persons.[21] The operative word in this provision is 'includes', which is defined under Article 259 4(b) as meaning 'includes but not limited to',[22] therefore, the list adduced in Article 260 is not exhaustive.
From science, we know that the human life begins after fertilisation. Similarly, from the Constitution, we know that the life of a person begins at conception. Therefore, is an embryo a person given that its life begun at conception? Also, given that the list in Article 260 is non exhaustive, could an embryo form part of this list of entities that are considered persons but are not included in that list? Again, the Constitution entitles every 'person' to the right to life and not every 'human organism'. Given that some arguments posit that human embryos are human organisms but not persons, therefore they are not entitled to moral respect and others that state that human embryos are human beings and are entitled to moral respect and rights, what could be the way forward in settling this conundrum?
The notions of personhood and moral status in African philosophical thought can provide the necessary answers. Motsamai Molefe identifies two metaphysical and two normative notions of personhood in African philosophy.[23] The metaphysical notions of personhood specify some specific characteristics that are the basis for acquiring personhood.[24] The first metaphysical notion of personhood that he identifies is personhood as personal identity.[25] This notion is grounded in African communitarian thought which defines a person in reference to the environing community.[26]Additionally, this notion emphasises the interconnectedness of the individual and the community as is evident in the assertions of scholars such as John Mbiti who coined the phrase, "I am because we are and since we are therefore I am."[27]
In African communitarianism, personhood is attained when a person is fully integrated into the society, when they have the capacity for moral thought and conduct themselves in a morally upright and virtuous way.[28] Furthermore, the attainment of rights in African communitarianism is contingent on the performance of duties to the community and the attainment of personhood from being incorporated into the society and from virtuous conduct.[29]
From this school of thought we can draw the following conclusions: (i) personhood is defined in reference to the community, (ii) personhood is attained upon integration into the community and upon virtuous conduct (iii) the attainment of rights is contingent upon the performance of duties. The second metaphysical notion is the descriptive notion, which I interpret as a liberal communitarian perspective. This notion stipulates that one is a person by virtue of possessing certain characteristics or ontological properties that constitute human nature and that belong to the human species.[30] Therefore, as Molefe quotes, one is a person because of what he is, not because of what he acquires.[31] Thus, one is a person prior to acquiring any habits, characteristics or prior to socialisation.[32]
The normative conceptions of personhood are divided into patient-centered and agent-centered conceptions.[33] The patient-centered conception assigns value to an entity by virtue of it possessing characteristics that render it morally significant.[34] For example, a human being is accorded value because it belongs to the human species by virtue of the characteristics it possesses. The agent-centered notion of personhood is concerned with the moral conduct of the agent. If an agent is morally virtuous, they count as a person, if they are not, then they do not count as a person.[35] This agent-centered notion of personhood is dependent on whether one lived up to the moral standards of their community.[36]
Having analysed the metaphysical and normative conceptions of personhood, we can conclude that a human embryo neither fulfills the first metaphysical conception of personhood as personal identity, nor does it fulfill the agent centered conception of personhood. This is because, it does not have the capacity to form social relationships nor exercise moral virtue. However, an important thing to note here is that despite the embryo not attaining personhood based on these two notions, it has the potential to develop capacities of attaining personhood based on these two notions if given the chance to develop.[37]It is due to this potentiality that the moral obligations of respect towards human embryos arise.[38]
In conclusion, the conceptions of personhood in African philosophy answer our questions as follows: from the descriptive notion of personhood and the patient-centered notion, an embryo is a human being since it possesses certain properties that make it a human being such as human DNA. From the notion of personhood as personal identity and the agent-centered notion of personhood as moral virtue, an embryo is not a person since it does not have the capacity to form social relationships nor does it have the capacity for moral virtue. From all the conceptions of personhood discussed, and the potentiality argument, both the mere fact of being human and the attainment of personhood entitle an entity to rights and respect. Lastly, we have moral duties of respect towards human embryos.
Despite finding clarity on the personhood and moral status of human embryos, the ethical dilemma of whether embryonic stem cell research is ethical or unethical still remains. Sanctioning research that destroys entities which we have accorded value and holds moral claims of respect towards seems unethical. Conversely, allowing the avoidable suffering of people who could have received help as a result of human embryonic stem cell research goes against the principle of beneficence. The predicament that remains is therefore finding a middle ground between ethical sensibilities and the demands of beneficence.
* The author is an undergraduate LLB student at the Kabarak University School of law in Nakuru, Kenya, the Editor-in-Chief of the Kabarak Law Review.
[1] Kwasi Wiredu, 'Conceptual decolonization as an imperative in contemporary African philosophy: Some personal reflections', 36, Philosophies africaines : traversées des experiences (2002), 54.
[2] Motsamai Molefe, An African ethics of personhood and bioethics: A reflection on abortion and euthanasia, Palgrave Macmillan, 2020, viii.
[3] Katrien Devolver, The ethics of embryonic stem cell research, Oxford University Press, 2015, 3.
[4] Devolver, The ethics of embryonic stem cell research, 4.
[5] Devolver, The ethics of embryonic stem cell research, 5.
[6] Devolver, The ethics of embryonic stem cell research, 8.
[7] Devolver, The ethics of embryonic stem cell research, 9.
[8] Devolver, The ethics of embryonic stem cell research, 9.
[9] Devolver, The ethics of embryonic stem cell research, 9.
[10] Devolver, The ethics of embryonic stem cell research, 9.
[11] Devolver, The ethics of embryonic stem cell research, 3. See also, Tom Beauchamp, 'The principle of beneficence in applied ethics', in Edward N Zalta (ed.)The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2019).
[12] Robert P George and Patrick Lee, 'Talking point on morality and human embryo research', EMBO Reports, 305.
[13] George and Lee, 'Talking point on morality and human embryo research', 305.
[14] George and Lee, 'Talking point on morality and human embryo research', 301.
[15] Devolver, The ethics of embryonic stem cell research, 16.
[16] George and Lee, 'Talking point on morality and human embryo research', 305.
[17] Cheryl Cox Macpherson, 'Global bioethics: Did the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights miss the boat', 33(10) Journal of Medical Ethics, 2007, 589.
[18] National Council for Science and Technology, 'Guidelines for the Ethical Conduct of Biomedical Research Involving Human Persons, Guideline 4.2.3 (iii).
[19] Constitution of Kenya (2010), Article 26(1).
[20] Constitution of Kenya (2010), Article 26(2).
[21] Constitution of Kenya (2010), Article 260.
[22] Constitution of Kenya (2010), Article 259(4)(b).
[23] Motsamai Molefe, An African philosophy of personhood, morality, and politics, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019, 2.
[24] Molefe, An African philosophy of personhood, morality, and politics, 4.
[25] Molefe, An African philosophy of personhood, morality, and politics, 2.
[26] Dennis Masaka, 'Person, personhood and individual rights in Menkiti's African communitarian thinking', 65(4), A Journal of Social and Political Theory (2018).
[27] John Samuel Mbiti, African religions & philosophy, Anchor Books, 1970, 141.
[28] Ifeanyi Menkiti, 'On the normative conception of a person,' in K Wiredu (ed) Companion to African philosophy, Oxford, 2004, 324-331.
[29] Menkiti, 'On the normative conception of a person. 324-331.
[30] Molefe, An African philosophy of personhood, morality, and politics, 2.
[31] Molefe, An African philosophy of personhood, morality, and politics, 2. See also Kwame Gyekye, 'Person and community in African thought', Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, 1, 101-122.
[32] Molefe, An African philosophy of personhood, morality, and politics, 2.
[33] Molefe, An African philosophy of personhood, morality, and politics, 5. See also; K Behrens, Two 'normative' conceptions of personhood' Quest, 25, (2013) 103-119.
[34] Molefe, An African philosophy of personhood, morality, and politics, 5.
[35] Molefe, An African philosophy of personhood, morality, and politics, 5.
[36] Molefe, An African philosophy of personhood, morality, and politics, 5.
[37] Motsamai Molefe, 'An African ethics of personhood and bioethics: A reflection on abortion and euthanasia', University of Cape Town Institute for Humanities in Africa (HUMA) < https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gzaWuptygSg&t=1209s > Accessed 28 September 2023.
[38] Molefe, An African ethics of personhood and bioethics < https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gzaWuptygSg&t=1209s > Accessed 28 September 2023.
